668 241 cadre was the instrument of land redistribution and brought into the countryside the first major change decreed by Peking. The cadre organized the Peasants' Association in the village and manipulates its meetings and its officers It was the cadre who worked up sentiment and organized the "speak bitterness" meetings in the days of the Land Reform Movement -- occasions used to the full to attack the old familial order in the villages. It is the cadre who organizes the "struggle meetings" in which villagers are made to engage in criticism and self-criticism in order to undermine the old values and instill the new.

The cadres also pushed the organization of "mutual-aid teams" for the sharing of labor and equipment, an effort that struck at the familial organization of farm labor and apparently met with serious difficulties.[16] More recently the cadre has been the instrument for the concerted attempt to build producer co-operatives in the countryside. In such major efforts as the attempt to put Hunan rice farming on a two-crop basis (hitherto only done further south), the cadres were reportedly responsible for training 100,000 farmers.[17]

873 208 The cadre carried on the effort to destroy traditional mores. He publicizes the new marriage law, discourages or prevents arranged marriages,

16. W. W. Rostow The Prospects of Communist China, Cambridge, 1954, p. 84.

17. Reported by New China News Agency, Changsha, April 20 1955; Survey of China Mainland Press (SCMP), No. 1036, April 28, 1955.

208 lectures on sanitation, and sometimes with the
873 help of radio, films, and mobile theatrical units dramatizes the issues of the day, the need for the farmer to sacrifice, to send his sons to the army, to contribute labor to community projects, to inform on his neighbors, to buy bonds, and so forth. The cadre establishes "winter schools" in which the peasants are given intensive political indoctrination practical training, and instruction in reading and writing. Hunan reported that 2,500,000 peasants were enrolled in these schools in the winter of 1955.[18]

425 The age-old drive of the vigorous peasant to
668 increase his family's land holdings is checked by fear lest he be re-classified as a "rich peasant" and be subject to higher taxes and other pressures. Yet what the Communists deplore as the peasant's "spontaneous capitalistic tendency" has not been crushed and the landholdings of the more enterprising grow in size.[19]

474 The effort to force various forms of co-operative
668 work has not been completely successful.

> "...when a serious team-use of labor, tools and farm animals was attempted, a variety of unsatisfactory results emerged; quarrels among the families interfered with efficient output; no one assumed responsibility for the upkeep of communal property; the claims of inefficient members violated the sense of equity of the more efficient..."[20]

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18. People's Daily, Jan. 30, 1955; SCMP 984, pp. 30-31.

19. Rostow op. cit., p. 152, cites the Peking People's Daily, Feb. 15, 1954.

20. Rostow op. cit., p. 84.

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656 key centers in the village area, guard and help
668 to ship government grain, assist in the extermination of "bandits," and attend militia "cultural" and organizational activities. A parallel scheme is instituted in the city. Urban residents are generally expected to render certain services in the areas where they live. In addition to attending regular meetings, they are expected to serve as patrols whenever patrols become necessary.

668 Controls imposed by security agencies
• 208 and other organizations, including large-scale rationing programs and constant investigations, contribute to public discontent. However, the Communists recognize the limits of public inconvenience and growing dissatisfaction. They stress the employment of a mass-line policy, which, to some extent, will absorb mass complaints, and they mobilize their propaganda machine for better effect.

B. Tension within Organizations

668 Although the various control agencies
578 employed by the Party to supervise and to ensure the execution of Party directives within a government organization help to maintain Party supremacy, their functions and responsibilities often overlap, resulting in confusion

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Annex "A," Subparagraph 2g,
Political Background

PROPAGANDA AND PUBLIC INFORMATION

I. INTRODUCTION

208 In Communist China, agencies for the dissemination of public information places stress on propaganda and education. As it is true of all Communist countries, the Chinese People's Republic is guided by the inviolable principle that all facts and issues must be selected and interpreted in the light of Marxist theories and the current Party line. Limited by source materials of a regional character, the following discussion on public information and propaganda in East China will attempt to cover only the basic facts about the formal structure, operation, and government control of the principal media of mass communication in the region. Wherever possible, exemplary cases in each medium will be included.

II. PRESS

A. News Services

204 Before the Communists occupied the East China Region in 1949, the Nationalist government-operated Central News Agency played the leading role in supplying the newspapers in this area with material. Services of foreign press associations were available; dispatches by such major institutions as the Associated Press, United Press,

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208 What is the official Communist Party line concerning the press? This question has been answered by Lenin himself in his much-quoted statement: "A newspaper is not only a collective propagandist and a collective agitator; it is also a collective organizer."[3] Later Mao Tse-tung echo his ideological master by saying: "The duty of a Party newspaper is not only to propagandize and agitate, but more specifically it must serve as the messenger transmitting the Party's policies."[4] Chairman Shu T'ung of the Cultural and Educational Commission, East China Military and Political Committee, was translating this press policy into action when he said in 1950 that the relations between government and "independent" newspapers needed readjustment.

The Communists in East China have followed this press policy. In March 1952, the Chieh-fang Jih-pao [Liberation Daily], this region's leading newspaper, tonge-lashed the Su-nan Jih-pao [South Kiangsu Daily] for having failed to take the cue from the Party. As a result the latter published a lengthy "self-criticism" as a gesture of repentance.[5] In 1953, Chairman Shu T'ung again reiterated that the cardinal mission of the press was

3. Alex Inkeles, Public Opinion in Soviet Russia, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1950, p. 135.

4. The Communist Propaganda Work, Ta-lu Fei-ch'ing Nien-pao [Annual Reports on Communist China], Taipei, Chung-kuo hsin-wen ch'u-pan-ssu, 1954, p. 148.

5. Chieh-fang Jih-pao [Liberation Daily], Shanghai, March 20, 1952.

to "strengthen and uphold the practice of criticism and self-criticism and set up a clear propaganda line."[6] In January 1954, Communist authorities in this region sent Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, president of the Liberation Daily, to Moscow for two months to study the operation of Pravda. This was the latest action in the Communist effort to run East China newspapers in absolute conformity with the orthodox Party line.

To implement this policy the Communists had, until June 1954, a Cultural and Educational Commission under the East China Military and Political Committee. Shu T'ung, chairman of the commission, is a veteran Communist authority on cultural and educational affairs. His experience dates back to 1939 when he served as head of the political department of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region Government. Since 1949 he has been in charge of the propaganda department for the Communist Party's East China branch. Under this commission and directly responsible for the press administration in this region was the Information and Publications Bureau, with Chang Ch'un-ch'iao as its chief. Within the region, each province had an information and publications department. These were the tools which the Communist Party and the Peking regime used to control the regiona press. Since the dissolution of the East China Military and Political Committee in 1954, the provincial information and publications departments have become directly responsible to their superiors in Peking and to the propaganda

6. Ibid., Feb. 22, 1953.

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204 departments at the corresponding levels of the
208 Communist Party hierarchy.

These government and Party agencies work closely with the leading newspapers, and the lesser newspapers closely watch the metropolitan ones for cues. The information and publications department relays Peking's instructions, passes on the issues to be emphasized or suppressed, and generally supervises the entire press operation.

The Communists began tightening their control on export of newspapers in the winter of 1951. By the spring of 1953, all except a few official and national newspapers were placed on the contraband list. Since then it has been extremely difficult to secure accurate data on the number of newspapers and their circulation in any region of the Mainland. Earlier statistics show that in 1950 at least nineteen "government" newspapers in this region had been merged into other larger government organs.[7] At present, scattered reports show that at least one major newspaper is published in each province in East China.

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7. Shu T'ung, loc. cit.

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217 4. Libraries and Cultural Centers Small libraries have been established throughout this region to cater to the workers, farmers, and shopkeepers. In November 1950, 216 libraries were open to the public in northern Kiangsu Province, and there were some eighty small libraries in the city of Shanghai. The plan for 1951 was to add 2,500 similar libraries in the farm areas, 1,000 in factories, government offices and schools, and 3,000 in units of the armed forces within the region.[28] By July 1951, rural libraries in East China[29] numbered 1,400 and those in factories totaled 400.

The cultural center is a version of the Communist cultural "palace" on a smaller scale. Both are provided for Communist-conducted cultural activities such as discussion group meetings, political rallies, and reading classes. The larger centers have facilities for showing motion pictures. Most reserve some space for reading rooms.

In conjunction with the libraries and cultural centers, there are also popular science education centers. Through exhibits, movies, lectures, and other available means, these centers strive to furnish the public with a basic knowledge of the natural sciences.

208 204 D. Application and Effectiveness of the Press As a Propaganda Medium

28. SCMP, No. 20, Nov. 30, 1950, p. 7.
29. Ibid., No. 136, July 17, 1951, p. 15.

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204 Communist cultural and educational workers are ready to claim success in bringing the press closer to the masses. There is evidence to support the conclusion that Communist press control in East China is thorough, in spite of the fact that Shanghai before 1949 had the largest number of independent newspapers of all the cities in East China. Under a rigid system of control, the effectiveness of the press as a medium of public information and propaganda is restricted or aided by certain characteristics.

1. Thought reform. The remolding of a newspaperman's thought is not a new subject in East China. One of the recent official expressions on this subject was pronounced at the Shanghai Branch of the East China Study Committee. The committee was organized by leaders of the cultural circles in this region to study Marxist, Leninist, and Maoist theories. The occasion was a meeting held by the committee to discuss thought reform among newspapermen. At the end of the meeting, the following conclusions were reached: (a) freedom of the press was wavering objectivism without a definite viewpoint; (b) effort to improve the appearance of the newspaper such as the format and graphic beauty was but trifling formalism; (c) the belief that a journalist was "a king without a crown" was anarchism that defied government organization and discipline.[30] The last reference to the professional freedom of

30. Chin Ta-k'ai, "Chung-kung Ti Ch'u-pan K'ung-chih" ["The Communist Control on Publications,"] China Weekly, No. 56 Jan. 25, 1954, pp. 7-9.

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208 a newspaperman as a "king without a crown"
204 was an expression popular in Chinese press circle By reaching the conclusion the Communist have fired a salvo at all the traditional standards and principles held by the newspapermen. A new professional standard is established for Chinese journalists -- to report the facts selected for them in order to educate the readers to support government policy.

2. Easy to read and believe. The Communists are always keenly aware of the importance of making newspapers easy to read. Early in their underground days they used as a motto O. A. Piatnitskii's remark that "revolutionary newspapers must be written in plain and popular language so that they can be understood by the masses."[31] Especially in Shanghai, where a concentration of workers presented the first challenge to Communist propaganda agents, the newspapers and other publications catering to uneducated and semi-educated readers are carrying out the long-established Communist policy of "explaining the political problems in the simplest possible terms."[32] Local expressions and trade jargons are freely adopted. To a person trained in classical Chinese and accustomed to

31. Translation appears in Hung-chi [Red Flag], Jan. 15, 1932. Osip Aronovich Piatnitskii author of such standard treatises on Communist propaganda and agitation as World Economic Crisis: the Revolutionary Upsurge and Tasks of the Communist Parties, and World Communists in Action, was idolized by Chinese Bolsheviks in early 1930's.

32. Red Flag, March 10, 1932.

208 reading the serious writings of pre-Communist
204 days, the new language of the Communist press would sound strange if not silly. But the new style does increase the popular appeal of the publications.

3. Opportunity to learn through propaganda. The Communists also bring to the public a good quantity of much-needed rudimentary knowledge on the natural sciences and public health, and sanitation. The unskilled laborer, who had no opportunity to learn anything except what he acquired in his daily routine, now can gain something from the special columns and feature stories in the newspapers. The Liberation Daily prints regular columns on literature, health, and science. Smaller newspapers in East China have their columns tailored to suit the literacy level and specific need of their respective reader groups. In addition, there is at least one magazine catering to each of the professional strata in East China, and for each periodical on a certain subject, there are dozens of pamphlets published every year to reach readers of varying degrees of education. The propaganda angle in most of these publications is obvious. Even in the most technical treatises, the general slant is to contrast the present with the past. The evils of the past are blamed on the "reactionary Kuomintang" or "American imperialism." The present is praised and the credit goes to Mao Tse-tung or to Communism. Take the case of an article on tractors, for example. The articles does not openly attack the technical excellence of American

208 tractors; but it insists that America gave guns to
204 the Nationalists, not tractors to the peasants. Having described Russian-made tractors, the article concludes with the assertion that Mao Tse-tung and the Russians are working to bring tractors to the peasants. The technical aspects of the subject are not neglected, but the propaganda line is skilfully underscored throughout the text. Readers who need the technical information contained in articles of this sort are continually exposed to a propaganda bombardment.

4. Cultivation of News Reading. It would be greatly misleading to compare the Chinese Communist press with the American press and to judge the former's effectiveness thereby. The Chinese press has never permeated community life to the degree that the American press has. Except for small sections of China's urban population, no Chinese would feel at a loss if he had no morning paper to read at the breakfast table. By and large the Chinese Communists are cultivating the newspaper-reading habit The entirely new experience of reading the newspapers or of having them explained is exciting to the average man on a lower Yangtze River farm or in the southern Fukien hills. It is believable that Li Ch'un-yü, a 52-year-old worker at a P'eng-lai factory in Shantung Province, pasted the day's newspaper above his head and read it every morning and every night; or the woman worker Shen Mei-li of the Shanghai Textile Factory felt that her day's work was not done until she had finished reading the newspaper.[33] Li and Shen

33. Liberation Daily, June 2. 1952, p. 3.

208 have no previous experience with which to contrast
204 the present one; therefore, they do not know what might be expected of a newspaper. To people like Li and Shen, the press in East China obviously has a great appeal. As to the section of the urban population which has had some experience in reading non-Communist newspapers, some people have embraced Communism and therefore welcome the Communist press, and others are forced to accept the Communist press, because there is no alternative. The only section of the population which probably does not want to read the Communist press at all is the storekeepers and some of the middle-class readers in larger cities. Having been among the supporters of what might be described as China's yellow journalism, which had a limited popularity in the larger cities in pre-Communist days, these people have no incentive to read the dull and drab Communist newspapers.

5. Delayed reporting. Another general criticism against the Chinese Communist press is that it contains no news and that it is history. With the unwieldy system of checking and double-checking, news dispatches are often delayed. The report on Malenkov's downfall, for instance, did not reach this region until announced by Tass three days later. But lack of promptness in reporting certain political events apparently does not impair the effectiveness of the controlled East China press, and certainly will not reduce its appeal to the unsophisticated masses.

6. Limited circulation. Quantity may not be a reliable criterion to gauge the effectiveness of the press in East China. According to Commu-

208 204 nist statistics in 1951 there was one copy of a daily newspaper to every 150 persons, and one copy of a magazine to every 280 persons. While this may appear to be limited circulation, other methods of news dissemination supplement the regular press.

7. Slanting the news and restricting coverage. Two developments may fatally damage the effectiveness of the press in East China. The newspapers in this region, like those in many other areas, slant the news for propaganda purposes. No gross inaccuracies have been reported, but as the readers become more sophisticated, inaccuracy of news reports will destroy confidence in the press.[34] The Communists have also attempted to restrict the circulation of local newspapers to their respective districts.[35] This was done under the pretext of avoiding duplication and waste in the distribution of newspapers. While the move may be necessary in view of East China's planned economy at the present stage, the effectiveness of the press as a medium of mass communication is curtailed when the newspapers cannot freely purvey news from one locality to another. Magazines, pamphlets, and books in this region are as yet free from this restriction.

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34. Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Peking, Sept. 26. 1951.

35. Central News Agency dispatch, quoted in Review of Hong Kong Chinese Press, No. 174 Hong Kong American Consulate-General, Sept. 19-20, 1953.

207 popular request after more than 14,000 listeners registered a wish to learn the language.[42] This program was designed to serve audiences of three language levels -- beginner, intermediate, advanced -- three times each day for each level, totaling three and a half hours.

Other provincial and municipal stations rebroadcast verbatim important regional programs. Announcers normally use Mandarin. No commercials or dramatic serials are broadcast; calisthenics lessons are usually presented every morning and musical programs are broadcast at convenient hours so that audiences may gather to sing songs. Literacy hours are also featured on some stations; small groups are organized to follow these programs in order to gain facility in reading.

C. Application and Effectiveness of Radio as a Propaganda Medium

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The Communists in East China claim that their radio networks, with the minor shortcomings noted, have been a success. To examine this claim critically, it is necessary to take into consideration the observations outlined below.

1. Station Control. The control of broadcasting stations has been thorough, even in a place like Shanghai where private interests may still maintain a toehold in radio operation. However, since every aspect of radio is closely supervised by the government and the Party, the

42. Liberation Daily, June 15, 1952 p. 3.

207/208 entire system soon showed signs of the weaknesses that generally bedevil an unwieldy bureaucracy. Every move originates from Peking and meticulously follows the orthodox Party line. No station manager is allowed to use his own initiative; if he tries, he will be accused of deviation and subject to extreme penalties.

207 2. Expansion of radio. Lack of facilities remains a stumbling block to radio expansion. In addition to such measures as "wire broadcasting stations," radio news bulletins, blackboard and wall newspapers, the Communists in East China are sending radio teams to the countryside. These mobile teams carry radio sets with them and, upon reaching a village, organize listening groups to hear some of the special programs. This measure has proven effective when the Communists have a special campaign to carry out.

While impressive results may have been achieved during such campaigns, lack of facilities makes success necessarily sporadic. The Communists admit that: (a) the listening groups are not very well-organized, for they die out as soon as they are formed. (b) The programs are not closely related to the issues foremost in the minds of the audience in the various localities. (c) There is an acute shortage of radio personnel to carry out successfully the mission assigned by the Regional Station. (d) Local radio personnel fail to keep close contact with their superiors, and the blame for this lack of co-ordination must be shared by both parties. (e) Local governments, particularly those of outlying hsien, are not sufficiently aware of the importance of radio work, and much

207 acting as leaders, daily news items are discussed and debated until the students are found to be in favor of the Communist regime. When the news that Seoul had fallen into Allied hands was broadcast in 1951, receiving officers were directed to explain the development as a strategic necessity, not as a sign of defeat, lest the students become skeptical about the Communist slogan that "the United States is but a paper tiger." There are evidences that most of the students were convinced by this line of argument.

207 208 5. Propaganda. A national hookup used to support propaganda campaigns is probably the most effective means of dissemination. Co-ordinated with the press, these radio programs receive advance attention and the masses are psychologically prepared for the scheduled programs. In the Communist Land Reform Movement, this technique was employed to increase agitation against the landlords. In the "Aid-Korea" Movement and the subsequent "Germ Warfare" campaigns, students and soldiers were encouraged to broadcast their hatred of "American warmongers." One skillful propaganda twist was employed during the campaign to "oppose America's effort to revive Japanese militarism" in 1951. The Communists in East China mobilized those who had lived under Japanese occupation or had encountered Japanese troops during World War II. Japanese atrocities were publicized. Atrocities were presented as eye-witness accounts. In conclusion, all these broadcasts ended with the warning that "the United States must not be allowed to support the Japanese militarists in re-enactment of the

207 tragedies visited upon the Chinese people in
208 1937-45." Such propaganda stirred up national resentment against both the Americans and the Japanese. During this particular propaganda campaign, the Communist claimed that over three-fourths of Nanking's population were reached by national-hookup "live" broadcasts.[43] Similar technique was used in the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, when citizens were urged to report on "corrupt officials" and inefficiency in government agencies. A national survey showed that from March 1 to May 31, 1951, the forty-nine people's broadcasting stations throughout Mainland China organized 380 such nation or regional hookup broadcasts. Over 36,000,000 people were said to have listened to the programs, and the stations received 186,000 letters, telegrams, and telephone calls as evidence of the people's respone.[44] Photographs are available in Communist publications showing old peasant women crying under a loudspeaker which is supposedly relaying a live broadcast of the mass trials; or a youth shouting in response to the call for suppression of counterrevolutionaries; or a young country girl beaming broadly upon hearing the news of the promulgation of the Marriage Law. These pictures, of course, may be the opposite of what the captions claim. But there is no denying that the Communists have succeeded in a large measure in mastering the art of mass persuasion and that radio is being fully exploited in Communist China.

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43. People's Pictorial, October 1951.

44. Ibid.

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IV. STAGE AND SCREEN

208 536 The stage and screen are effective media for bringing messages to the illiterate and semi-literate. The Communists realize this and have been fully exploiting the possibilities of both forms of mass communication. A summary of the developments in this region follows:

A. Stage

1. Control. The key directive in the Communist policy for development of the stage as a medium of mass communication is the consolidation and reform of the available facilities and personnel before expansion is begun. This approach was adopted by officials concerned with dramatics in East China immediately upon the establishment of new local governments in 1949. The system of control includes both professional and amateur dramatic groups. Professional actors, playwrights, and stage workers have their respective associations led by a provincial federation of such associations. In larger cities, artists also have their organizations belonging to the same pyramid. Amateur dramatic groups are encouraged and aided by these associations. Before abolishment of the Greater Regional governments, the provincial federation received orders from regional authorities. Now the provincial federations work hand in hand with provincial governments and Communist Party branches, receiving direction from the Cultural and Information administrations under the State Council in Peking. The Drama Reform Bureau

208 under the Cultural Administration is directly
536 and exclusively responsible for interpreting broad policies laid down by the Communist Party. In East China, Ch'en Wang-tao, as chief of the Cultural Bureau for this region, remained the highest authority in charge of development of drama until June 1954 when regional agencies were abolished. Ch'en Wang-tao, a noted leftist writer in East China, has had a long literary career.

The control system in this region was organized rapidly; by April 1950, most of the provincial federations had had at least one conference of delegates from local associations.[45]

2. Development. The development of the new-type stage plays in this region dates from the May 4th Movement of 1919. New dramatic troupes have gone a long way in expanding their activities to reach throughout the countryside. In 1950, over 300 plays new and old scripts revised, had successful runs in Shanghai. Most of these plays were widely circulated in this region. In the spring of the same year, a dramatic contest was held. Over ninety theaters and 4,000 actors participated in the contest; ninety-two plays were judged successful by popular acclaim. Professional actors and actresses were registered for indoctrination classes. In July 1950 the second class in Shanghai graduated over 1,000 trainees from all parts of East China Together with the training program in Nanking, about 3,000 actors and actresses had received political indoctrination by the middle of 1950.[46] At the same time, 2,572

45. Compendium of Government Reports, p. 64
46. Ibid.. pp. 563, 611.

208/536 village dramatic troupes were performing in Shantung Province.

Although recent statistics on the development of the stage in East China are not available, national figures found in the Communist press indicate that many new plays have been published and staged and the number of trained professionals has been on the increase. Many of the new plays were written by local amateurs among whom were workers and students. Being adaptations of stories of local origin, most of the plays have a distinct local flavor; but their central themes show very little variation: they praise the new regime and glorify those who support government policy.

The conversion of old operas and stories, substituting Communist ideas for traditional ideas of filial piety and loyalty to friends is a more delicate job. One of these pieces is Liang Shan-po yü Chu Ying-t'ai, a one-act opera with thirteen scenes. The story originated in Chekiang Province many years ago and has been opera. The East China Drama Academy revised it as a modern Chinese opera in August 1951.[47] Since then the script has been printed in many national literary magazines and staged in various partsof China, and it was made into a motion picture in 1953. Although technical adjustments have been made, the plot

47. Hua-tung Ti-fang Hsi-chü Ts'ung-k'an [East China Drama], No. 1, Shanghai, Hsin-wen-i ch'u-pan-she, 1954, p. 3.

208 536 and the theme remain unaltered. The original story tells of the experience of a girl who, failing to marry the man she loves prefers death to marrying the man chosen for her by her parents. This is one of the few revised pieces that have survived waves of criticism and attacks by orthodox Communist cultural workers Many others did not fare so well. Playwrights in East China have been ordered to revise old operas and stories. The Communists realize that since the old stories have been accepted and symbolize certain concepts in the minds of the audience, the job of remolding them without damaging their effectiveness and classic content is a difficult one.

Song and dance are used extensively both on and off stage. Their versatility as media of information and propaganda has long been recognized by the Communists. As early as 1950, the Communist-organized Association of Musicians in Shanghai had already turned out 1,405 new songs, of which 155 received official blessing and were given wide circulation.[48] Musical and dance number arranged to depict a political theme are frequently presented at the cultural centers and by propaganda teams traveling in the countryside. (For more discussion on song and dance, see the chapter on Literature and Artistic Expressions in this handbook.)

3. Recent Trends. Chairman Shu T'ung of the Cultural and Educational Commissions of East China at a conference in Peking in January 1953 was told to pay closer attention to the choice of plays and actors. He was to devise a system for a rigid screening of the players and closer supervision of the plays. Now the Regional Government

48. Compendium of Gov't Reports. p. 563.

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208 536 is no longer in existence. but this official policy will be expected of responsible officials at the provincial level.

B. Motion Pictures

546 208 1. Control. The Communist consolidation of control of the motion picture industry and its activities followed a pattern of similar design to that of the control of the stage. The seizure of existing facilities and the indoctrination of personnel preceded a planned expansion. Motion picture production in this region is but a part of the nationally centralized undertaking. At this writing, there seems to be no independent film-production company in East China to complicate the problem of control. The regional, or -- after June 1954 -- provincial Cultural and Educational Commission is responsible for executing Peking's orders on control of the movie industry and is subject to supervision by Communist Party propaganda agencies at appropriate levels. To handle administrative details, there are branches of the Motion Picture Association of China in all provinces and major municipalities. The association co-ordinates film production and distribution, again under the supervision of the government control system. Movie actors and workers are organized and are supervised by the Motion Picture Association of China. It would be a fine network of co-ordination for business promotion, if the industry were independent. But as it is in East China, the system amounts to a complicated machine in which every part of the movie industry is hamstrung by overnment orders and none can function individually.

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208 To bar "undesirable" European and American films, censorship has been established on the regional and provincial levels.

2. Development. The Shanghai Motion Picture Producing Company is among the three government concerns established immediately after the founding of the Peking regime in late 1949. The company combines the former first and second Central Motion Picture Production companies of the Kuomintang, the former China Motion Picture Production Company, and the Experimental Movie Factory.[49] Its establishment concentrates all of the major movie-producing facilities in the East China Region. Seven small private companies were still in operation in East China in late 1950. However, the fact that these firms were "helped by the East China People's Government to resume operation"[50] indicates they could no longer have a voice in supervision of production.

The first motion pictures made by the Communist-controlled companies in East China were documentaries and newsreels. No significant film was made in 1949 or in the spring of 1950. By summer of 1950, the first new film with an integral plot was made in this region. Entitled "The Thought Problem," the film deals with the ideological transition from traditional Chinese concepts, and Westernized "bourgeoisie" Chinese attitudes popular among the metropolitan Chinese to the Marxian mode of thinking. It was hailed in East China as a turning point in Chinese motion

49. Tu-pao Shou-ts'e [Newspaper Reading Handbook], Hankow Ch'ang-chiang jih-pao she, 1950, p. 252.

50. Compendium of Gov't Reports, p. 563

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208 pictures. Since 1951, much progress has been claimed by the Communists, but there are evidences of continuing deficiency. The literary purges that have been going on in East China exert restrictive influence on script-writers. Scarcity of suitable scripts is the constant complaint of those in charge of motion picture production. The theaters are forced to supplement their meager supply with newsreels depicting the progress of China's economic reconstruction and a steady flow of Russian films. A Japanese journalist reported upon his return from a visit to Red China in 1953 that the average theater in a large Chinese city needed about eight films a month, that the government could only supply one or two; the rest were Russian films.[51]

To handle distribution, the East China Region had as early as 1949 a branch of the national China Motion Picture Distribution Company, another government-directed agency. The company itself also functions as a clearing-house and a censor while doling out the films on a planned quota. Apparently no theater is permitted to have direct dealings with any producer, domestic or foreign. In 1950, the distribution company was already serving about one hundred theaters in Shanghai, Nanking, and the provinces of Kiangsu, Chekiang, and Anhwei. So far there has been no report on any large-scale construction

51. Chao Ts'ung, "I-nien-lai Chung'kung Ti Wen-hua Kung-tso" ["The Chinese Communist Cultural Work during the Past Year"], China Weekly, Jan. 4, 1954, p. 36.

of theaters in this region. However, a program for building "cultural palaces" with facilities for showing films is under way. Eventually the government aims at having one such "palace" in every city, large village, and industrial and mining center. Meanwhile mobile motion picture projection teams keep their regular routes to serve the countryside. Early in 1950, a total of over one hundred such mobile teams were traveling throughout Mainland China. In East China, Chairman Shu T'ung of the Cultural and Educational Commission for this region said in July 1950 that more personnel were being trained to expand the mobile teams. By October 1951 there were 60 mobile projection teams serving this region.[52]

3. Recent Trends. For movie production in East China, the recent trend is either to translate or copy "progressive films" of foreign vintage. The Shanghai Motion Picture Producing Company planned to copy, in collaboration with the Northeast Motion Picture Producing Company, over forty foreign films in 1954. Most of these films were Russian. A few East German, Czechoslovakian, North Korean, Japanese, and Italian products were also included. "Bicycle Thief" was among the Italian movies slated for translation.[53] For one thing, translation and copying of foreign films already approved by Communist theoreticians must be a relief to the purge-haunted East China script-writers. Moreover,

52. Liberation Daily, Oct. 1, 1951, p. 10.
53. Enlightenment Daily, Peking, April 6, 1954, p. 2.

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208 the Chinese movie-goers, especially those in such metropolises as Shanghai and Nanking, are accustomed to foreign films, especially American products. Russian films are equally attractive. In Shanghai, often more than a dozen theaters show the same film simultaneously.[54] Anti-Communist writers tend to attribute this fact to the short supply of films, and the popularity of theaters to the boredom of life in a Communist state. Chinese films such as "Liang Shan-po yü Chu Ying-t'ai" and the "White-Haired Girl" have extensive showings in East China. American films were not immediately banned in East China, but Communist authorities in 1950 discouraged people from patronizing theaters showing American films. In April 1950 American films in Shanghai were drawing some 570,000 patrons a month.[55] This figure represented a drop in attendance of approximately 50 per cent as compared with the record in pre-Communist days. Attendance continued to decline until today no American film is advertised in the newspapers of this region.

C. Lantern Slides

In April 1950, the Peking government established an agency in charge of the manufacture

54. Liberation Daily, June 27, 1952, p.3.

55. Compendium of Government Reports, p. 563.

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208 of lantern slides and projectors. At the government-operated Nanking Scientific Apparatus Factory, production of slides and projectors was also assigned top priority. By 1952, there were 31 units in China producing such equipment to supply "cultural centers" and libraries. Among the slides produced, the most popular series bore such titles as "100 Years of American Aggression in China," "The Angry Fire of the Resist-America-Aid-Korea Movement," and "Oppose the Re-arming of Japan by American Imperialism." Almost 200,000,000 people were said to have seen these and other slides[56] in 1951. In East China by the end of September 1951, there was at least one projector in use in each hsien.[57] According to Wang Yu', deputh director of the Social Cultural Affairs Department for East China, these projectors were to be used to inform the public on current affairs, government policies, and the popular sciences. Mobile motion picture teams and propaganda units frequently make use of slides to aid their operation. Slides are prized because they can be easily adapted to local conditions. Each propaganda unit may suggest ideas to the manufacturers, who tailor the materials to suit specific needs.

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56. People's Handbook, 1952, p. 444.
57. Liberation Daily, Shanghai, October 1, 1951, p. 10.

V. MASS ORGANIZATIONS AS MEDIA OF PUBLIC INFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA

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The Communists are fond of using the word "network" for all activities pertaining to public information and propaganda. Already discussed in this study are the news-gathering network, radio network, library and book-distribution network, the motion-picture-showing and cultural center network. Included in the Communist term of "cultural network," however, are many mass organizations, all contributing to the over-all public information, education, and propaganda scheme.[58]

One of these organizational networks is the Sino-Russian Friendship Association. Established on October 5, 1949, in Peking, this organization expanded rapidly and by February 1952 had 64,200 large and small branches with a total membership[59] of 23,000,000. Under the over-all direction of Liu Shao-chi, whose position in the Party hierarchy is said to be second only to that of Mao Tse-tung, this association through its omnipresent branches organizes, indoctrinates, and propagandizes people of all professional strata. The daily contribution to public information and propaganda takes the form of group discussions and meetings.

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58. A list of 96 such national mass organizations is found in People's Handbook, 1955, pp. 7-8.

59. People's Handbook, 1952, p. 258.

203 208 575 At these small group gatherings, Soviet theories and practices are discussed. When there is a national propaganda campaign, the association mobilizes all its branches to give concerted support to the government. These mass organizations have their own "cultural departments," which in reality are information and propaganda units. Altogether the "cultural network" of an average size hsien may easily contain 4,000 units, with over 30,000 people actively participating.[60] When applied to cities like Shanghai and Nanking in East China, these figures are but moderate estimates.

V. PERSONAL CONTACT

203 208 Any study of public information and propaganda in Communist China would be greatly amiss if it discounted the importance of personal contact. This particular medium of communication is essential to the Communist public information and propaganda scheme, and it works most effectively in a country like China where 80 per cent of the population is illiterate.

The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, on January 1, 1951, issued a directive on the "Establishment of a Propaganda Network Aimed at the Masses." The directive points out that" (a) in the past propaganda work has been neglected; no permanent

60.Chao Ts'ung, op. cit., p. 36.

203 personnel had been assigned to conduct person-
208 to-person propaganda, counteracting rumors and clarifying government policies; (b) all Party branches henceforth will assign propaganda officers; all guiding agencies in the Party will appoint reporting officers; enthusiastic activists, although non-Party members, may also be enlisted as propaganda officers; (c) under the direction of the Party, propaganda officers will conduct propaganda through personal contact, and will report on the people's reaction and response; (d) the reporting officers, all responsible Party members serving at the various Party and government agencies, will make political reports to mass assemblies at least once every two months. Their reports are subject to clearance by Party authorities.[61]

Execution of the foregoing directive in East China resulted in the registration of 650,000 propaganda officers by the end of 1951. The reporting officers during the same period gave political talks to some 19,790,000 people.[62] It was admitted by the same Communist source, however, that "some of these propaganda officers were not sufficiently effective."

In the summer of 1953, Communist authorities moved to strengthen the system of

61. Chien-li Hsüan-ch'uan-wang [Establishing a Propaganda Network] Shanghai, Hua-tung jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1951, pp. 1-6.

62. People's Handbook, 1952, p. 437.

203 personal propaganda by establishing what might
● 208 be described as "coaching stations" for propaganda officers. At these stations propaganda officers met twice a month, each session lasting about two hours. With the help of well-seasoned agitators acting as coaches, the propaganda officers received on-the-spot instructions on how to operate most effectively. In June 1953 over 50 per cent of the sub-districts and hsiang in East China had such stations in operation.[63]

Anti-Communist sources conclude that the establishment of such "coaching stations" is a testimony to the collapse of the Communist person-to-person propaganda system.[64] Communist reports, on the other hand, claim that propaganda and reporting officers have come to be regarded by the people as "information bureaus," "thought doctors," and "messengers of Chairman Mao Tse-tung." If these titles reflect the popular conception of these propaganda officers, then there is reason to believe the claim that personal contact has exerted decisive influence on the masses in the movements to suppress counterrevolutionaries, carry out land reform, "Resist-America-Aid-Korea," and increase industrial and agricultural production.[65]

63. Chin Ta-k'ai "Chung-kung Hsüan-ch'uan-wang Ti Fa-chan Chi Ch'i P'o-ch'an" ["The Development and Collapse of the Chinese Communist Propaganda Network"], in China Weekly, No. 70, May 3, 1954, p. 12.

64. Ibid.

65. People's Handbook, 1952, pp. 436-37.

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208 The significance of the part played by personal contact in the Communist propaganda scheme is well described in a People's Daily editorial. The Party had been relying on separate propaganda campaigns to achieve its goals, the editorial said, and Party members had thought constant personal contact not essential to the success of propaganda. Now everyone admits that "propaganda officers are trail-blazers without whom no work can be undertaken."[66]

VII. CONCLUSION

A. The Extent of the System

208 The Communist propaganda machine, which uses all types of public-information media, is co-ordinated with mechanical precision. The highest policy-making body in the Party hierarchy decides on the issues to be propagandized; an order from this body is enough to start a chain reaction. Take the 1951 movement to "suppress counterrevolutionaries," for example: the decision was made in Peking in February 1951. To borrow a cliche from the Communists, the movement "spread like a forest fire": and by October of the same year, all the tools of propaganda had been brought into play. Major newspapers, radio stations,

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66. People's Daily, Peking, January 1, 1, 1952, p. 3,

group discussions, special rallies with lantern slides and skits were concentrated upon the suppression of counterrevolutionaries. During the same period, 800 exhibits pertaining to the campaign were opened in Shanghai. One of the pamphlets, Penal Code for Counterrevolutionaries, sold 2,400,000 copies, or enough to supply half the population of Shanghai. In response, 33,000 letters were received from residents of Shanghai, reporting "counterrevolutionary activities" to the government; and 29,000 of those accused were brought to court. The campaign was reported to have been carried out with equal intensity throughout East China.[67] The figures themselves may be exaggerated. But saturation campaigns of this sort had been effective in this area even before the Communist occupation of East China. During the war against Japan, the Nationalists organized propaganda teams which succeeded in arousing the villagers of western Fukien to the support of Chiang Kai-shek as the nation's leader and to participation in the war that was threatening the very life of the country.

B. The Thoroughness of Operation

Western journalists visiting the Communist area during a lull in the Nationalist-Communist struggle were surprised at the assimilation of Communist political jargon shown by grade-school children. This achievement of Communist indoctrination and propaganda suggests how thoroughly the Communist propaganda

67. Statistics from People's Handbook, 1952, pp. 41-42.

208 system operates. From his first years, a child is subject to persistent Communist indoctrination. The first word he learns in grade school is Communism, and from then on he lives and breathes Communism. He would be a rare person if he did not become a devout Communist as an adult. To be sure, the distrust of the old and wise and the cynicism of the urbane will work against Communist propaganda, but in Communist China the old and wise are dying and the urbane are only a small fraction of the population. In twenty years, the Communist-trained youth of today will control the country.

C. Prospects of Success or Failure of Communist Public Information and Propaganda

Lacking evidence to the contrary, it seems correct to say that the majority of the population in East China are willing to accept the Communist regime or, for that matter, any leadership which promises to bring a measure of order and stability to their community after so many years of chaos. For them, freedom of expression is not of vital importance to their way of life. The reaction of the remainder of the population is difficult to discover, since only a few people from East China has escaped. Even if the testimonies of the refugees were coherent and comprehensive, it would be ill-advised to accept their stories as accurate measurements of popular reaction to Communist propaganda in East China.

208 It is impossible to say what kind of counterpropaganda will be needed to offset Communist propaganda. However, there is at least one weakness innate in the Communist propaganda system. After the masses have been taught to read and write, these people may become curious about the outside world and demand to know more facts concerning it. Russian people maintain their curiosity about the We st in spite of nearly forty years of Communist indoctrination.[68]

68. See, for example, "Mr. Kleiner's Russian," Newsweek, Sept. 5, 1955, p. 17.

8: Hinder G-3 (1933-1942) 1944 AF15 East China AF15

CHAPTER II

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BACKGROUND FACTORS

633 THE GENERAL ATTITUDE of the Chinese residents towards the
648 international [illegible] foreign administration in the Settlement was a basic factor which had to be taken into consideration in the efforts to create a municipal instrument designed to achieve social progress. No patriotic Chinese citizen could approve a situation in which part of his country was alienated from the direction of the Chinese government, notwithstanding its prosperity and progressiveness in peaceful times, and however useful the existence of such areas had proved to the Chinese people in times of distress and civil disturbance. Until 1926 the membership of the Shanghai Municipal Council had been entirely non-Chinese: in that year Chinese councillors were chosen, taking their seats in 1928. In 1930 the number was increased to five. For those accepting seats to agree to associate themselves with the foreign administration, and for Chinese civic organizations to elect such members, meant a compromise with their national feelings, though this was perhaps tempered by satisfaction that the ranks had been opened to them. Though they had chosen to reside in the International Settlement in Shanghai it could be said of no large number of Chinese that they had any warm attachment to the administration which controlled it.

633 Relationships between the people and an administration are not
648 a matter of remote and academic attitudes. They are the every-
664 day contacts between the people and the employees of the admin-
208 istration at the level where the people live. They are the relations between the people and the individual members of the police force, with the health inspectors, with the building inspectors and so on. The majority of Shanghai municipal posts carrying responsibility were filled by foreign members of staff, chiefly of British nationality though with a sprinkling of Continental European, American and Japanese staff. In 1930, after one of the periodical staff surveys, it was accepted in principle that qualified Chinese would be ap-

3: Hinder G-5 (1933-1942) 1944 AF15 East China AF15

pointed in greater numbers to senior positions. This decision was somewhat slowly implemented. When the Japanese occupation of the Settlement took place in December 1941 there were in the general Council service still comparatively few Chinese of specialist training. The total Chinese staff was nevertheless much larger than the foreign, comprising many in clerical grades and in lower police ranks. The majority of the Council's staff were men of high professional achievement and sterling character. This did not preclude the currency in the community of criticisms against municipal employees. It could be said also that there were residents who were ready to escape compliance with the requirements if they could.

Such attitudes toward the administration and its staff did not make easy the beginnings of a Division which found it essential to obtain the confidence of the people. Moreover, as the preceding chapter shows, the actual issue as to whether the Shanghai Municipal Council should exercise any controls over industrial enterprises and so over labour in the Settlement, was a political one over which feelings ran high. To the more or less passive resistance on the part of sections of the Chinese community to the foreign administration was added a specific resistance in the concern of the Council with Chinese labour matters, a reaction which was national and emotional in origin and was kept up by propaganda means.

The Chinese population in the International Settlement enjoyed complete freedom of expression. This freedom was exercised particularly in criticism of the Settlement administration. Through powerful newspapers and through a Chinese Ratepayers' Association a constant pressure was maintained on the administration, and this was by no means unaffected by it. It has therefore to be realised that a potent influence was exercised by the Chinese population thus vocal and free.

Important, too, when the creation of a Division with social aims was under way, was the attitude of the Chinese residents toward the social situation, as well as that of the Council. There was a general acceptance on the part of both of prevailing poverty. The Council's acquiescence sprang from the traditional interpretation of its responsibilities imposed in the charter of administration, the Land Regulations. It was argued, not without logic though perhaps at the expense of imagination, that the limited revenues available